What is the no-miracles argument and how does it support Scientific Realism?

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What is the no-miracles argument and how does it support Scientific Realism?

The no-miracles argument is a key argument in support of scientific realism, which is the philosophical position that scientific theories aim to provide an accurate description of the world and that the entities postulated by these theories actually exist. The argument is based on the observation that scientific theories have been remarkably successful in making accurate predictions and explaining various phenomena.

According to the no-miracles argument, the success of scientific theories cannot be merely attributed to luck or coincidence. Instead, it suggests that the best explanation for the success of these theories is that they are approximately true or at least have a significant degree of truth. In other words, if scientific theories were not at least approximately true, it would be highly unlikely for them to consistently produce successful predictions and explanations.

The argument draws an analogy between the success of scientific theories and the success of technological devices. Just as the success of a technology, such as a GPS system, is taken as evidence of the underlying scientific principles being true, the success of scientific theories in making accurate predictions and explanations is seen as evidence for their truthfulness.

Furthermore, the no-miracles argument highlights the indispensability of scientific theories in our everyday lives. Scientific theories underpin various technological advancements and practical applications, demonstrating their reliability and usefulness. If scientific theories were not at least approximately true, it would be difficult to explain their effectiveness in guiding our actions and shaping our understanding of the world.

In summary, the no-miracles argument supports scientific realism by asserting that the remarkable success of scientific theories in making accurate predictions and explanations cannot be dismissed as mere luck. Instead, it suggests that the best explanation for this success is that scientific theories are at least approximately true, providing a reliable and accurate description of the world.