What is the evidential argument from gratuitous evil?

Philosophy Problem Of Evil Questions Long



50 Short 53 Medium 71 Long Answer Questions Question Index

What is the evidential argument from gratuitous evil?

The evidential argument from gratuitous evil is a philosophical argument that seeks to demonstrate the existence of gratuitous or unnecessary evil as evidence against the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God. It challenges the traditional theistic belief that God allows evil for a greater purpose or as a means to achieve a greater good.

The argument can be summarized as follows:

1. If an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God exists, then there would be no gratuitous evil in the world.
2. There is gratuitous evil in the world (evil that serves no greater purpose or is unnecessary).
3. Therefore, an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God does not exist.

The argument focuses on the existence of evil that appears to have no justifiable reason or purpose. It acknowledges that some evil may be necessary for the greater good, such as the pain experienced during medical procedures for the sake of healing. However, the argument contends that there are instances of evil that cannot be justified in this way.

Proponents of the evidential argument from gratuitous evil often provide examples of such evil, such as the suffering of innocent children, natural disasters causing immense destruction, or the existence of diseases that inflict immense pain and suffering. These instances of evil are seen as unnecessary and incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God.

Critics of the argument may respond by suggesting that our limited human perspective prevents us from fully understanding the reasons behind certain instances of evil. They argue that what may appear as gratuitous evil to us may actually serve a greater purpose in the grand scheme of things, beyond our comprehension.

In response, proponents of the argument may counter that if an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God exists, then we should expect to see a clearer connection between the existence of evil and a greater purpose. They argue that the existence of gratuitous evil undermines the notion of an all-good God who could have created a world without such unnecessary suffering.

Overall, the evidential argument from gratuitous evil challenges the compatibility of the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God with the presence of evil that appears to serve no greater purpose. It raises important philosophical questions about the nature of God and the problem of evil, inviting further exploration and debate within the realm of philosophy.