Philosophy Of Mind Questions Long
Eliminative materialism and reductive materialism are two distinct philosophical positions within the field of philosophy of mind. While both theories aim to explain the relationship between the mind and the physical world, they differ in their approach and conclusions.
Eliminative materialism, also known as eliminativism, argues that our current understanding of the mind is fundamentally flawed and that we should eliminate or discard our existing mental concepts and vocabulary. According to eliminative materialists, our everyday folk psychology, which relies on mental states and explanations, is based on outdated and inaccurate theories. They propose that mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and emotions, do not exist as discrete entities or properties in the brain. Instead, they argue that these mental states are merely constructs or illusions that do not correspond to any physical reality.
Eliminative materialists contend that as neuroscience and cognitive science advance, our understanding of the brain and its processes will render our current mental concepts obsolete. They advocate for a complete overhaul of our mental vocabulary and the adoption of a more scientific and neuroscientific approach to understanding the mind. In this view, mental states are seen as mere theoretical constructs that will eventually be replaced by a more accurate and comprehensive scientific account.
On the other hand, reductive materialism, also known as physicalism or identity theory, asserts that mental states are ultimately reducible to physical states or processes in the brain. Reductive materialists argue that mental phenomena, such as thoughts, sensations, and consciousness, can be fully explained and understood in terms of the underlying physical processes occurring in the brain. They believe that mental states are identical to or supervene upon physical states, meaning that mental properties are dependent on and determined by physical properties.
According to reductive materialism, mental states can be reduced to neurobiological processes, neural activity, or the interactions of neurons and synapses. This reductionist approach seeks to bridge the gap between the subjective experiences of the mind and the objective observations of the physical world. It suggests that mental states are not separate entities but rather emergent properties of the physical brain.
In summary, the main difference between eliminative materialism and reductive materialism lies in their stance towards mental states. Eliminative materialism argues for the elimination or rejection of our current mental concepts, considering them as illusory or outdated. In contrast, reductive materialism seeks to explain mental states in terms of physical processes, aiming to reduce mental phenomena to their underlying physical components.