What is moral non-naturalism?

Moral non-naturalism is a philosophical position within metaethics that asserts that moral properties and facts are fundamentally different from natural properties and facts. According to moral non-naturalism, moral truths cannot be reduced to or explained by naturalistic or scientific facts.

Non-naturalists argue that moral properties, such as goodness or rightness, are objective and exist independently of human beliefs or desires. They believe that moral facts are irreducible and cannot be fully understood or explained in terms of naturalistic or empirical observations. In other words, moral non-naturalists reject the idea that moral truths can be derived from or reduced to natural facts about the world.

One prominent form of moral non-naturalism is ethical intuitionism, which posits that moral truths can be known through direct intuition or perception. Ethical intuitionists argue that moral knowledge is not derived from empirical evidence or logical reasoning, but rather through a direct apprehension of moral truths.

Another form of moral non-naturalism is non-cognitivism, which denies that moral statements express propositions or convey factual information. Non-cognitivists argue that moral language is primarily used to express emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions rather than to state objective facts.

Moral non-naturalism stands in contrast to moral naturalism, which holds that moral properties can be reduced to or explained by natural properties. Naturalists argue that moral truths can be understood through empirical investigation or scientific inquiry.

In summary, moral non-naturalism is a philosophical position that asserts the existence of objective moral properties that are fundamentally different from natural properties. It rejects the reductionist approach of explaining moral truths solely in terms of naturalistic or scientific facts.