Philosophy Metaethics Questions Medium
Moral intuition non-cognitivism is a philosophical position within metaethics that argues moral judgments are not based on cognitive reasoning or beliefs, but rather on emotional or intuitive responses. According to this view, moral statements do not express propositions that can be true or false, but rather they express the speaker's attitudes, emotions, or desires towards certain actions or situations.
Non-cognitivists reject the idea that moral judgments can be objectively true or false because they believe that moral language does not refer to any objective moral facts or properties in the world. Instead, moral statements are seen as expressions of personal preferences, individual emotions, or social conventions.
One prominent form of moral intuition non-cognitivism is called emotivism, which was developed by philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson. Emotivists argue that moral statements are simply expressions of the speaker's emotions or attitudes, and they serve to influence others or express approval or disapproval. For example, when someone says "stealing is wrong," they are not making a factual claim about the nature of stealing, but rather expressing their negative emotional response towards stealing.
Another form of moral intuition non-cognitivism is called prescriptivism, proposed by R.M. Hare. Prescriptivists argue that moral statements are not descriptive claims about the world, but rather they function as universal prescriptions or commands. When someone says "stealing is wrong," they are not stating a fact, but rather prescribing or commanding others not to steal.
In summary, moral intuition non-cognitivism is a metaethical position that denies the cognitive nature of moral judgments and instead views them as expressions of emotions, attitudes, preferences, or social conventions. It challenges the idea of objective moral truths and emphasizes the subjective and non-factual nature of moral language.