Philosophy Metaethics Questions Long
In normative ethics, the distinction between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism revolves around the nature of moral judgments and the possibility of objective moral truths.
Moral cognitivism, also known as moral realism, holds that moral judgments are cognitive in nature and can be objectively true or false. According to this view, moral statements express propositions that can be evaluated for their truth value. For example, the statement "lying is morally wrong" is seen as making a factual claim about the moral status of lying. Moral cognitivists argue that moral truths exist independently of individual beliefs or cultural norms, and they can be discovered through reason or empirical investigation.
On the other hand, moral non-cognitivism rejects the idea that moral judgments are cognitive and can be objectively true or false. Instead, it posits that moral statements do not express propositions but rather serve other functions, such as expressing emotions, attitudes, or preferences. Moral non-cognitivists argue that moral judgments are subjective and vary from person to person or culture to culture. For example, the statement "lying is morally wrong" is seen as expressing a negative emotional response towards lying rather than making a factual claim about its moral status.
One prominent form of moral non-cognitivism is emotivism, which was developed by philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson. Emotivism holds that moral judgments are simply expressions of individual emotions or attitudes. According to this view, when someone says "lying is morally wrong," they are not making a claim about the objective moral status of lying but rather expressing their disapproval or condemnation of lying.
Another form of moral non-cognitivism is prescriptivism, proposed by R.M. Hare. Prescriptivism argues that moral judgments are not descriptive but rather prescriptive in nature. Moral statements are seen as commands or recommendations for action, guiding individuals on how they should behave. For example, the statement "lying is morally wrong" is understood as a prescription against lying, urging individuals not to engage in such behavior.
In summary, the distinction between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism in normative ethics lies in their differing views on the nature of moral judgments. Moral cognitivism asserts that moral judgments are cognitive and can be objectively true or false, while moral non-cognitivism argues that moral judgments are non-cognitive, expressing emotions, attitudes, or preferences, or serving as prescriptions for action.