Philosophy Metaethics Questions Long
Moral realism and moral non-realism are two contrasting positions within the field of metaethics, which is concerned with the nature and status of moral claims. These positions offer different perspectives on the ontological status of moral facts and the objectivity of moral judgments.
Moral realism posits that moral facts exist independently of human beliefs, attitudes, or cultural practices. According to moral realists, moral truths are objective and universal, meaning they hold true regardless of individual opinions or cultural variations. Moral realism suggests that moral statements can be objectively true or false, and moral properties such as goodness or badness are inherent features of the world.
One prominent form of moral realism is ethical naturalism, which argues that moral properties are reducible to natural properties. Ethical naturalists believe that moral facts can be discovered through empirical investigation and scientific inquiry. For example, they might argue that the statement "murder is wrong" is true because it corresponds to the natural fact that murder causes harm and violates human well-being.
On the other hand, moral non-realism rejects the existence of objective moral facts and instead emphasizes the subjective or relative nature of morality. Non-realists argue that moral judgments are not grounded in any external or universal truth but are rather expressions of personal preferences, cultural norms, or social conventions. Moral non-realism encompasses various positions, including moral subjectivism, cultural relativism, and error theory.
Moral subjectivism holds that moral judgments are based on individual attitudes or emotions. According to this view, moral statements are expressions of personal preferences or feelings and cannot be objectively true or false. For instance, a moral subjectivist might argue that the statement "lying is wrong" is true for someone who personally dislikes lying but may not be true for someone who does not share the same attitude.
Cultural relativism, another form of moral non-realism, asserts that moral judgments are relative to specific cultures or societies. According to this view, moral standards are determined by cultural norms and practices, and what is considered morally right or wrong can vary across different societies. Cultural relativism suggests that moral diversity is a natural consequence of cultural differences and that there is no objective standard to judge one culture's moral values against another.
Error theory, proposed by philosophers like J.L. Mackie, takes a more radical stance by arguing that all moral claims are fundamentally mistaken. Error theorists claim that moral language is inherently flawed and that moral judgments are based on illusory beliefs. They argue that moral statements, such as "stealing is wrong," are neither true nor false because they refer to non-existent moral properties.
In summary, moral realism asserts the existence of objective moral facts that are independent of human beliefs, while moral non-realism denies the existence of such facts and emphasizes the subjective or relative nature of morality. These two positions offer contrasting perspectives on the ontological status and objectivity of moral claims, shaping our understanding of ethics and influencing debates on moral philosophy.