Philosophy Metaethics Questions Long
Moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism are two contrasting positions within the field of metaethics, which is concerned with the nature and foundations of ethics. These positions offer different perspectives on the relationship between moral facts and the natural world.
Moral naturalism posits that moral facts are ultimately reducible to natural facts. It argues that moral properties, such as goodness or rightness, can be understood in terms of natural properties, such as pleasure, well-being, or evolutionary fitness. According to moral naturalism, moral truths can be discovered through empirical investigation and scientific inquiry. Naturalists believe that moral facts are objective and mind-independent, meaning they exist independently of human beliefs or attitudes. They argue that moral judgments can be grounded in facts about the natural world, and that moral principles can be derived from empirical observations.
On the other hand, moral non-naturalism rejects the reduction of moral facts to natural facts. It asserts that moral properties are irreducible and cannot be fully explained in terms of natural properties. Non-naturalists argue that moral facts are objective but non-natural, meaning they exist independently of the natural world and are not reducible to any naturalistic explanation. They believe that moral truths are discovered through rational intuition or reflection, rather than empirical investigation. Non-naturalists contend that moral properties are sui generis, distinct from any natural properties, and cannot be reduced to physical or scientific terms.
One key distinction between moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism lies in their respective views on the relationship between descriptive and normative claims. Naturalists argue that moral claims can be understood as descriptive claims about the natural world, while non-naturalists maintain that moral claims are fundamentally normative, expressing what ought to be the case rather than describing what is the case.
Another important difference is their stance on the possibility of moral knowledge. Naturalists believe that moral knowledge is attainable through empirical investigation and scientific methods, as moral facts are ultimately grounded in the natural world. Non-naturalists, however, contend that moral knowledge is accessible through rational intuition or reflection, as moral facts are not reducible to natural facts and cannot be discovered through empirical means alone.
In summary, moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism offer contrasting perspectives on the relationship between moral facts and the natural world. Naturalists argue for the reducibility of moral properties to natural properties, while non-naturalists assert the irreducibility and distinctiveness of moral properties. These positions differ in their views on the nature of moral facts, the relationship between descriptive and normative claims, and the possibility of moral knowledge.