Philosophy Metaethics Questions Long
In metaethics, cognitivism and non-cognitivism are two contrasting positions regarding the nature of moral judgments and the language used to express them. Cognitivism holds that moral judgments are cognitive in nature, meaning they express beliefs or propositions that can be true or false. On the other hand, non-cognitivism argues that moral judgments are non-cognitive, meaning they do not express beliefs or propositions and are not subject to truth or falsity.
Cognitivism asserts that moral judgments are akin to statements of fact, such as "lying is wrong" or "helping others is good." According to cognitivists, these moral judgments can be true or false, and they are based on objective moral principles or facts about the world. Cognitivists believe that moral language has a descriptive function, aiming to represent the moral reality objectively. They argue that moral judgments can be supported by evidence and reasoned about, just like any other empirical or scientific claim.
In contrast, non-cognitivism rejects the idea that moral judgments express beliefs or propositions. Non-cognitivists argue that moral language is primarily emotive or expressive, serving to express the speaker's attitudes, emotions, or desires towards certain actions or situations. For example, when someone says "lying is wrong," a non-cognitivist would interpret it as an expression of disapproval or a command not to lie, rather than a statement of fact. Non-cognitivists believe that moral judgments are subjective and cannot be objectively true or false.
One influential form of non-cognitivism is emotivism, which was developed by A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson. Emotivism posits that moral judgments are expressions of the speaker's emotions or attitudes, rather than conveying any factual information. According to emotivism, when someone says "lying is wrong," they are merely expressing their disapproval of lying, rather than making a claim about the objective wrongness of lying.
Another form of non-cognitivism is prescriptivism, proposed by R.M. Hare. Prescriptivism argues that moral judgments are not descriptive or emotive but rather function as universal prescriptions or commands. According to prescriptivism, when someone says "lying is wrong," they are not expressing their emotions or attitudes but prescribing or recommending that others should not lie.
In summary, the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in metaethics lies in their understanding of moral judgments. Cognitivism holds that moral judgments are cognitive, expressing beliefs or propositions that can be true or false, while non-cognitivism argues that moral judgments are non-cognitive, expressing emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions without conveying factual information.