Philosophy Identity Theory Questions Medium
The Identity Theory, also known as the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, proposes that mental states are identical to brain states. According to this theory, mental states, such as thoughts and sensations, are nothing more than physical states of the brain. However, the theory faces several criticisms regarding the concept of supervenience.
1. Explanatory Gap: One criticism of supervenience in Identity Theory is the explanatory gap. Supervenience claims that mental states supervene on physical states, meaning that any change in mental states must be accompanied by a change in physical states. However, critics argue that supervenience fails to explain the relationship between mental and physical states. It does not provide a satisfactory account of how mental states emerge from physical states, leaving an explanatory gap in understanding the nature of consciousness.
2. Multiple Realizability: Another criticism is the problem of multiple realizability. Multiple realizability refers to the idea that mental states can be realized by different physical systems. For example, pain can be experienced by humans, animals, or even potentially by future artificial intelligence. Critics argue that supervenience fails to account for this diversity of physical realizations of mental states. If mental states are identical to specific brain states, then it becomes difficult to explain how different physical systems can give rise to the same mental state.
3. Epistemic Gap: Critics also point out an epistemic gap in supervenience. While supervenience claims that mental states are dependent on physical states, it does not provide a clear method for determining the mental states based solely on physical states. This raises questions about how we can know or identify mental states solely through physical observations. Critics argue that supervenience does not bridge this epistemic gap, leaving a challenge in understanding the relationship between the mental and the physical.
4. Ignoring Qualitative Differences: Identity Theory, based on supervenience, suggests that mental states are identical to physical states. However, critics argue that this reductionist approach fails to account for the qualitative differences between mental and physical states. Mental states possess subjective qualities, such as the experience of pain or pleasure, which cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions alone. Critics argue that supervenience overlooks these qualitative differences, leading to an incomplete understanding of the nature of consciousness.
In conclusion, supervenience in Identity Theory faces criticisms regarding the explanatory gap, multiple realizability, epistemic gap, and the failure to account for qualitative differences. These criticisms challenge the adequacy of supervenience as a framework for understanding the relationship between mental and physical states in the context of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.