How does Identity Theory account for mental states that are not reducible to brain states?

Identity Theory, also known as the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, posits that mental states are identical to brain states. According to this theory, every mental state corresponds to a specific brain state, and there is a one-to-one correlation between them. However, there are instances where mental states appear to be irreducible to brain states, posing a challenge to the Identity Theory.

To account for these non-reducible mental states, Identity Theory proponents argue that the apparent irreducibility is a result of our current limitations in understanding the complexities of the brain. They suggest that as our knowledge and technology advance, we will eventually be able to explain and reduce all mental states to brain states.

Furthermore, Identity Theory acknowledges that mental states are not always directly observable or measurable, unlike brain states. Mental states involve subjective experiences, qualia, and conscious awareness, which are difficult to quantify or objectively study. This subjective aspect of mental states makes it challenging to establish a direct reductionist account.

In response to this challenge, Identity Theory proponents propose that mental states can be indirectly reduced to brain states through functional explanations. They argue that mental states can be understood in terms of their functional roles and relationships within the brain. By examining the causal and functional properties of mental states, they aim to bridge the gap between the subjective experience and the underlying brain processes.

In summary, Identity Theory acknowledges the existence of mental states that currently appear irreducible to brain states. It attributes this apparent irreducibility to our current limitations in understanding the complexities of the brain and the subjective nature of mental states. However, proponents of Identity Theory believe that with advancements in knowledge and technology, all mental states will eventually be explainable and reducible to brain states, either directly or through functional explanations.